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Recent Developments

United States v. Virginia

T

he United States Supreme
Court held in United
States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996), that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state from offering
a unique educational opportunity
to one gender when no comparable
opportunity is provided for the
excluded gender. The Court rejected the Commonwealth of Virginia's proffered justification that
the exclusion of women from the
Virginia Military Institute furthered the Commonwealth's important interest in providing diversity in the educational choices
offered to its residents.
The
Court's decision requires a government to advance an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" to sustain
disparate treatment based upon
gender.
In 1839, the Virginia General
Assembly established the Virginia
Military Institute ("V.M.I.") as one
of this country's first state military
Since its inception,
colleges.
V .M.I. has been maintained by the
Commonwealth of Virginia, subject to the control of that state's
legislature. In furtherance of its
stated mISSIOn of producing
"citizen-soldiers" for roles of leadership in public life, V.M.I. consistently refused to admit women as
cadets. In Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982), the Supreme Court held
that Mississippi's exclusion of
otherwise qualified males from a
state-sponsored school of nursing
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solely on the basis of gender violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Following that decision, V.M.!.
appointed a committee to study the
legality and wisdom of continuing
to exclude women. Consonant
with that committee's recommendation, however, V.M.I. continued
its single-sex admissions policy.
In 1990, the United States Attorney General filed a lawsuit on
behalf of a female student denied
admission to V.M.I. The complaint alleged that the Institute's
exclusively male admissions polICY violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. After a trial in the
United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, the
trial court rejected the United
States's equal protection challenge, reasoning that V .M.I.' s continued exclusion of women furthered Virginia's interest of ensuring diversity in an otherwise coeducational system. The United
States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court. Finding

that the Commonwealth of Virginia had advanced no sufficiently
important interest to justify the
exclusion of women from V.M.I.,
the court of appeals remanded the
case to allow Virginia to alter
V .M.I.' s admissions policy so as
not to violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Noting that the litigation
had not yet come to a final judgment, the United States Supreme
Court denied V.M.L's petition for
writ of certiorari in May of 1993.
Responding to the mandate of
the Fourth Circuit, Virginia proposed the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership ("V.W.LL.") as
a comparable alternative to the
education afforded men at V.M.!.
Located at Mary Baldwin College,
V. W.LL. would offer a four-year,
state-subsidized
undergraduate
program to approximately twentyfive women.
While sharing
V.M.I. 's mission of producing
"citizen-soldiers," the V.W.LL.
planned to employ a significantly
less adversarial means to achieve
this end.
Upon remand, the district court
concluded
that
the
Commonwealth's V.W.LL. proposal
satisfied intermediate constitutional scrutiny by offering women
a comparable educational experience. A divided panel of the
United States Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's judgment. The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the potential benefits offered
by a V.W.I.L. degree were "substantively comparable" to the ben27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 51
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efits offered by a V.M.I. degree.
By a margin of one vote, the
Fourth Circuit denied an en bane
rehearing. The Supreme Court
then granted both the United States
and the Commonwealth of Virginia's petitions for writs of certioran.
Writing for six justices, Justice
Ginsburg began the Court's analysis by identifying the two ultimate
issues presented by the case. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274 (Justice
Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case).
First, did the Commonwealth of
Virginia deny the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment when it
excluded fully capable women
from enrolling as cadets at V.M.I.,
thus denying a unique and extraordinary developmental opportunity?
Id. Second, if Virginia's denial of
this opportunity did violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, what is
the appropriate remedy? Id.
Justice Ginsburg initially reviewed the history of gender discrimination in the United States.
Id. at 2274-75. The Court observed that traditionally governmental distinctions based upon
gender need only survive "rational
basis" scrutiny to be constitutionally permissible. ld. at 2275. Under current analysis, however, such
discrimination must survive the
careful scrutiny established by
Hogan and JE.B. v. Alabama ex
reI. TB., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-76.
The Court enunciated a two-prong
test that gender-based exclusionary
treatment must satisfy so as not to

27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 52

violate the Equal Protection
Clause. ld. at 2275. First, once a
prima facie claim of gender discrimination has been established,
the party seeking to defend governmental classification based
upon gender must initially demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for the distinction.
Id. The burden of proving this
justification rests entirely with the
state. ld. Moreover, the justification must be both genuine, rather
than an ad hoc response to litigation, and may not rely upon overly
broad generalizations regarding the
differences in talents and capabilities between females and males.
ld. Second, under intermediate
scrutiny, all such gender-based
classifications must serve an important state interest, and the discriminatory means employed must
be substantially related to achievld. (citing
ing that interest.
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins.
Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
Applying the initial prong of
the test, the Court discussed Virginia's two asserted justifications
for continuing V.M.I. 's exclusively male admissions policy.
Id. at 2276. First, the Commonwealth argued that single-gender
education provides significant
educational benefits, as well as
increasing diversity in educational
opportunities. ld. Second, Virginia contended that V .M.I.' s adversative educational approach
would have to be discarded to accommodate the admission of
women. ld. In rejecting both proffered justifications, the Supreme
Court concluded "that Virginia has

shown no 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for excluding all
women from the citizen-soldier
training afforded by V.M.I." ld.
In analyzing Virginia's first
justification, the Court noted that
the Commonwealth's alleged interest in single-sex education bore no
resemblance "to 'the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory
classification. '" Id. at 2277 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730). Justice Ginsburg observed that, from
1839 through V.M.I.'s reaction to
the Hogan decision, there was no
evidence that indicated Virginia
actually sought to evenhandedly
advance diversity through an interest in single-gender education. Id.
at 2277-79. The majority rejected
Virginia's "diversity" argument,
reasoning that a "genuine" interest
in diversity would not be furthered
by a policy that only "serves the
State's sons, [but] makes no provision whatever for her daughters."
ld. at 2279. Implicit in this analysis was the determination that
Virginia's diversity justification
was only an ad hoc response to
litigation. See id. at 2277.
Turning
to
the
Commonwealth's second justification
for denying women admittance to
V.M.I., the Supreme Court acknowledged alterations would be
necessary to accommodate the
admission of women to V.M.I., but
rejected Virginia's premise that
these changes would necessarily
"destroy" V.M.I. ld. at 2279. The
Court cited testimony that some
women can endure the physical
activities required of cadets, as
well as the Fourth Circuit's earlier
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conclusion that V .M.I.' s adversative methodology is not "inherently unsuitable to women." ld.
(quoting United States v. Virginia,
976 F.2d 890,899 (4th Cir. 1992)).
Finally, the majority hypothesized
that the admission of women to
V.M.I. could mirror "[w]omen's
successful entry into the federal
military academies." ld. at 2281.
Thus, the court rejected the premise that admitting women to V.M.I.
would "destroy" the institution
because the admission of women
as cadets was not in conflict with
V.M.I.' s stated mission of producing "citizen-soldiers." ld. at 228182.
Having concluded that the
Commonwealth of Virginia fell
short of its initial hurdle of providing the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" necessary to justify
V.M.I. 's exclusively male admittance policy, the Supreme Court
next determined the appropriate
remedy for Virginia's constitutional violation. ld. at 2282. The
Court observed that a remedial
decree must closely correspond to
the constitutional violation, and
must place the disadvantaged parties in the position they would
have occupied absent the violation.
ld. (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 280 (1977)). Noting the
relative inferiority of V.W.I.L.'s
proposed endowment, military
training, student body, faculty,
course selection, physical facilities, and alumni network, the
Court concluded that a V.W.I.L.
degree would be substantially inferior to a V.M.I. degree for the foreseeable future. ld. at 2283-85.
Indicating that "[t]here is no rea-

son to believe that the admission
of women capable of all the activities required of V.M.I. cadets
would destroy the Institute rather
than enhance its capacity," the
Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth of Virginia could not
offer qualified women anything
less than "a V.M.I.-quality education." ld. at 2287.
Concurring with the Court's
judgment, but not its reasoning,
Chief Justice Rehnquist cited fourteen cases decided since 1976 to
support his argument that firmly
established precedent required that
gender-based discrimination must
only bear a close and substantial
relationship to an important state
interest. ld. at 2288. Hence, in
Rehnquist's opinion, the majority's requirement that government
must demonstrate an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" to sustain
gender classification unnecessarily
"introduces an element of uncertainty respecting the appropriate
test." ld. Ultimately, however, the
Chief Justice agreed with the result
reached by the majority since, as
proposed, V.W.I.L. "fails as a remedy, because it is distinctly inferior
to the existing men's institution
and will continue to be for the
foreseeable future." ld. at 2291.
In dissent, Justice Scalia theorized that V.M.I.'s exclusively
male admissions policy satisfied
traditional intermediate scrutiny.
ld. at 2293-94. He accused the
majority of introducing the "exceedingly persuasive justification"
requirement as the only means by
which the court could reach its
desired result. ld. at 2294-95.
Finally, Justice Scalia noted that

the effect of the Court's decision
would be to "enshrine[] the notion
that no substantial educational
value is to be served by an allmen's military academy." ld. at
2292.
The decision issued by the
United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Virginia reflected
a strengthened commitment to the
principle that the Constitution does
not permit a state to treat similarly
situated individuals differently
based upon gender except in the
most compelling circumstances.
The Court's reasoning, however,
arguably raised more questions
than it resolved. Significantly, it is
neither self-evident nor explained
in the Court's opinion how the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" requirement differs substantially from the prong of traditional
intermediate scrutiny requiring the
state to demonstrate an "important
governmental interest." Moreover,
the majority's analysis provided no
guidance as to whether the state
must now demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
in other equal protection categories
where the Court has traditionally
applied intermediate scrutiny.
While the majority opinion suggests a state may engage in gender
classification based upon a legitimate interest in diversity, lower
courts will have to struggle with
whether the breadth of the
Supreme Court's reasoning actually permits any circumstances
under which a state may legitimately offer a "unique" opportunity to dne gender without providing an absolutely comparable alternative to the excluded gender.
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 53
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